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The effect on production, trade and well-being from the granting of market access, 
removing export subsidies, and eliminating trade-distorting forms of direct support to 
farmers in WTO member countries is analyzed from a world-wide general equilibrium 
perspective using the most recently available data. The results suggest that removing 
trade barriers, subsidies and support will cause aggregate world prices of agricultural 
commodities to rise by over 11 percent relative to an index of all other prices.  
Agricultural support and protection in the developed countries is found to be the major 
cause of low agricultural prices, and implicitly, a tax on net agricultural exporters in 
developing countries. Livestock product prices are likely to increase the most from the 
reform of agricultural policies. Reform increase world trade in agricultural commodities, 
but the level of total agricultural production is left almost unchanged.  In the short to 
medium term, some net agricultural importing countries are likely to suffer a welfare loss 
due to an adverse change in their terms of trade that reform causes.  However, in the 
longer-run, reform of agricultural policies is found to benefit almost all countries and 
developing countries in particular due to the change reform induces in their pattern of 
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A Global Analysis of Agricultural Trade Reform  








The Uruguay Round (UR) of the negotiations brought agriculture under the 
discipline of the GATT for the first time.  The signatories to the UR Final Act (1994) 
committed themselves to reducing agricultural support and protection over the six-year 
period 1995 – 2000 (and 1995 – 2004 for developing countries) under three disciplines: 
domestic support, border protection and export subsidies.  The new negotiations on 
agriculture present an opportunity to achieve further reductions of policy distortions in 
global agriculture.  Agricultural trade barriers and producer subsidies inflict policy 
distortions in global agriculture.  With the growth in the globalization of the world 
economy since the previous round, more emphasis has been placed on the need to 
evaluate the costs of current trade and domestic policy distortions and the potential 
benefits from their full elimination in a global context, and in the context of a world 
economy with increased capital flows.  
 
The general purpose of this study is to assess the possible global impacts of 
further agricultural liberalization in some sector detail from a static-snapshot perspective, 
and in far less detail from a long-run dynamic perspective.  For this purposes we have 
chosen to analyze the case of profound policy reform, i.e., the elimination of most of 
agricultural support and trade protection throughout the world.  A global analysis of this 
type provides insights into what is at stake in world agricultural negotiations, and 
suggests the likely greatest effects on countries, both positive and negative, of the new 
agricultural negotiations.   
 
Following the Agreement on Agriculture in the Uruguay Round, we focus on the 
three disciplines: market access (trade barriers), export subsidies and domestic support.  
In general, trade barriers help keep inefficient domestic producers in operation, result in 
forgone opportunities for a more efficient allocation of national resources, and lower 
demand for trade partners’ products.  Domestic subsidies induce an oversupply of some 
agricultural products and help to retain resources in these agricultural sectors that can be 
used more profitably in other sectors.  The oversupply of agricultural commodities leads 
to low prices and unfair competition for producers in other countries and can create the 
need for export subsidies to dispose of excess domestic production.  Consumers are 
harmed not just by tariffs, which directly raise the cost of imports, but also by the 
negative effects that tariffs and subsidies have on the total return’s to labor, capital and 
other resources that make up consumer income.  Further, the short to medium-run effects   3
of policy reform on well-being can depart from the long-run effects due to changes in the 
longer-run pattern of investment and capital accumulation that reform induces. 
 
  
1.1 The context of the analysis 
 
To understand the individual and complementary effects of the various policy 
reforms on the global economy, we decompose the global effects of a full reform by type 
of policy being used and by country and commodity.  Specifically, we choose the 
following scenarios: (1) eliminating agricultural import barriers (tariff equivalents) 
throughout the world; (2) eliminating agricultural export subsidies throughout the world; 
(3) eliminating domestic support in the developed countries; and (4) the combination of 
(1) – (3).   It is important to identify specific country-region effects as real negotiations 
are often on a country basis. Moreover, countries are affected differentially by different 
policies, as some are net exporters of agricultural goods, others are net importers.  Also, 
the composition of agricultural exports from developed countries tends to vary from those 
of developing countries. Thus, to identify country’s/region’s effects, we further 
decompose the scenarios (1) – (4) by regional options.  For example, we address 
questions such as: what are the likely effects on world agricultural price and trade flows, 
and on the economy of other countries/regions if the EU were to eliminate its agricultural 
support and trade protection? 
 
We use four indicators to assess the effects of agricultural liberalization on the 
world economy, as well as on each country/region. These are: (a) changes in world 
agricultural prices, (b) change in world agricultural trade, and change in country’s exports 
and imports, (c) change in the level of agricultural production, and (d) changes in a 
measure of social well-being or welfare.  
 
1.2 Important assumptions 
 
The foundation for the analysis is an assessment of current levels of agricultural 
tariffs, domestic support and export subsides, and the use of tariff rate quotas.  As the 
applied tariff rates are not available for many countries, the bound rates of tariffs are used 
instead.  Data about non-tariff barriers are also not available for many countries.  For this 
reason, a calculated tariff equivalent rate is used to proxy the effects of all other import 
barriers.  Data on the gap between domestic prices and border prices are used to calculate 
the quota tariff equivalent rates.  These estimates are taken from ERS/USDA (2000).   
 
Other caveats need to be noted. First, tariff rates and tariff equivalent rates are 
based on the data in 1998.  Since tariff reductions have been undertaken by many 
countries after 1998, and since the bound rates are much higher than the applied rates in 
many cases, our analysis may overestimate the extent of tariff reduction that are 
presumed to take effect after 2000 for the case of some countries.  In the case of other 
countries and commodities, various non-tariff barriers are still in place, and hence, the 
tariff reduction cannot represent the full elimination of import barriers.  Our analysis in 
this situation may underestimate the extent of all import barriers.      4
 
Second, the analysis focusing on the effect of domestic support on world 
agricultural markets considers only the elimination of support in Australia, New Zealand, 
Japan, Korea, the United States, Canada, the EU, and the three countries in the European 
Free Trade Area. The removal of support in other countries is not considered.  However, 
the analysis does take into account that fact that many countries have recently adopted 
less distorting forms of farm support, and that there are differences in the effects of 
coupled and decoupled government payments received by farmers on production and 
trade.  For example, if subsidies were implemented by subsidizing intermediate inputs in 
grain production (coupled), the policy would affect farmers’ production decisions, and 
hence, removing such subsidies would affect farmer’s supply response.  When such 
subsidies are eliminated, farmers have incentives to adjust their planting structure, 
possibly allocating more land to other crops.  On the other hand, if the government chose 
direct payments to the owners of all farmland and with no crop targeting (decoupled), the 
policy would have little effect on the use of the land and hence the planting structure.  
Removing these subsidies would mainly reduce farmer’s income but have little effect on 
production.  For these reasons, we focus on the coupled farm subsidies and quantify the 
effects of eliminating such domestic support on production and trade. 
 
Third, we assume that labor and capital are mobile between agriculture and the 
non-agricultural sectors of an economy.  Relaxing this assumption would slow the supply 
response from countries having a comparative advantage in world agricultural markets, 
which may cause world agricultural prices to rise more than predicted by our analysis.  
Moreover, we assume that labor is fully employed.  This assumption places upward 
pressures on price since, if rural unemployed labor is available (which is likely in 
developing countries) supply response can occur at lower cost. 
 
Several other key assumptions are also made.  These are highlighted in the 
context of the specific analysis below. 
 
2. Removing trade barriers, subsidies and support will likely cause aggregate world 
prices of agricultural goods to rise significantly in the short to medium-run 
 
  World agricultural prices are sensitive to changes in the levels of border 
protection and domestic support.  The average rates of tariff equivalents are calculated 
using the data included in the GTAP Database version 5 for 1998, while the average rates 
of export subsidies and domestic support are provided by ERS (2000), as the GTAP 
database is inadequate in capturing the levels of export subsidies and domestic support.  
The average world agricultural tariff equivalent rate is 22 percent.  This rate is calculated 
as the ratio of the total revenues of all countries’ agricultural tariff equivalents to the 
value of their total agricultural imports.  The average world export subsidy rate is 2.9 
percent, and computed similarly.  The domestic support rate for the developed country 
group is 5.3 percent (table A1 in the Appendix). 
 
If we eliminate, world-wide, all tariffs (and tariff equivalents) on agricultural 
imports, export subsidies and domestic support, the results suggest that the index of   5
world agricultural prices would rise by 11.6 percent relative to the level of world non-
agricultural prices.  Since China is not a participatory member of the WTO at this time, 
this result is obtained without taking into account further agricultural liberalization in 
China.  If agriculture were also liberalized in China, the index of world agricultural price 
would rise by 12.2 percent, instead of 11.6 percent.  In other words, the effect of the 
equivalent level of reform in China’s agricultural policies to that which is presumed for 
other WTO members would cause world agricultural prices to rise by about 0.6 percent.  
In the following discussion, we presume that China maintains her current policies. 
 
  Given these considerations, the results suggest that eliminating border protection 
alone, world-wide, accounts for more than 50 percent of 11.6 percent increase in world 
agricultural prices.  That is, when we hold other policy variables constant and only 
eliminate agricultural import tariffs, world agricultural prices rise by 6 percent, again, 
relative to world non-agricultural prices (table 1).  This result obtains because import 
barriers protect domestic producers by restricting imports. Restricting imports causes, in 
many import-protecting countries, domestic consumers to face food prices that are higher 
than world prices while at the same time induces these countries to employ too many 
resources in agriculture. When import tariffs are eliminated, the demand for agricultural 
imported goods can rise (table 3), while supply contracts thus placing upward pressures 
on world agricultural prices. These upward pressures in turn induce agricultural exporting 
countries to increase production.  
  
Eliminating domestic support in the developed countries mentioned in Section 1.2 
appears to contribute more than 30 percent to the rise in world agricultural prices. In 
other words, when we hold other policy variables constant and only eliminate domestic 
support in the developed countries, world agricultural prices rise by 3.6 percent.  Farmers 
benefit from price support or indirectly from lowered production costs.  Reducing or 
eliminating domestic support in the developed countries lowers farm income, or more 
precisely, lowers returns to land, farm buildings and owner-operator labor.  In response to 
such a policy change, farmers in these countries are induced to reduce production, thus 
placing upward pressures on world prices.  
 
  Eliminating total export subsidies world-wide appears to be a minor factor 
contributing to a rise in world agricultural prices.  However, for the cases of sugar and 
livestock products, the elimination of these subsidies causes their prices to rise by more 
than 3 percent (table 2).  The main reason is that while world average export subsidies are 
much lower than the world import tariffs, they are relatively high for the cases of sugar 
and livestock (table A1).  When we hold other policy variables constant and only 
eliminate the agricultural export subsidies world-wide, the world agricultural price rises 
by 1.5 percent relative to the price of non-agricultural goods. 
  
2.1. Agricultural support and protection in developed countries is the major cause of 
low world agricultural prices 
 
If we decompose the pressures on the rise in world prices by developed – 
developing country groups, we find that agricultural liberalization in the developed Table 1. Decomposition of World Agricultural Price Effects of Global Agricultural
                Liberalization 
       --  Percentage Change in World Agricultural Price Index from the Base Year
Removing agricultural support and protection in all regions 11.55
         Removing agricultural support and protection in all developed countries   9.11
         Removing agricultural support and protection in the EU 4.39
         Removing agricultural support and protection in Japan and Korea 1.51
         Removing agricultural support and protection in the US 1.75
     Removing agricultural support and protection in all developing countries 2.32
Removing agricultural tariffs by all regions 6.03
     Removing tariffs in developed regions 3.77
Removing tariffs in the EU 1.47
Removing tariffs in Japan and Korea 1.37
Removing tariffs in the US 0.66
Removing tariffs in developing regions 2.30
Removing agricultural support in developed regions 3.55
Removing domestic support in the EU 1.96
Removing domestic support  in Japan and Korea 0.15
Removing domestic support in the US 0.93
Removing agricultural export subsidies in all regions 1.49
Removing export subsidies in developed regions 1.47
Removing export subsidies in developing regions 0.02Table 2. Decomposition of World Agricultural Price Effects of Global Agricultural
                Liberalization 
           --  Percentage Change in World Agricultural Price by Sector from the Base
EXP-1 EXP-2 EXP-3 EXP-4
Wheat 18.11 3.35 11.99 1.96
Rice 10.05 5.87 2.39 1.50
Other grains 15.15 1.35 12.23 0.59
Vegetable and fruits 8.16 4.94 -0.06 2.96
Oil & oilseeds 11.18 3.09 7.78 0.06
Sugar 16.36 10.88 1.61 3.31
Other crops 5.57 4.22 1.17 0.07
Livestock and products 22.27 12.16 5.53 3.09
Processed food 7.63 4.83 1.75 0.98
EXP-1: Removing all agricultural support and protection in the world
EXP-2: Removing tariffs in the world
EXP-3: Removing domestic support in the developed countries
EXP-4: Removing export subsidies in the worldTable 3. Decomposition of World Agricultural Trade Effects of Global Agricultural
                Liberalization 
    -- Percentage Change in Total Agricultural Trade from the Base Year
 
Value Volume
Removing agricultural support and protection in all regions
World trade 29.71 14.66
Exports of developed country group 31.81 13.75
Imports of developed country group 35.93 19.03
Exports of developing country group 26.50 16.05
Imports of developing country group 20.02 7.85
Removing tariffs by all regions
World trade 26.40 17.31
Exports of developed country group 31.28 20.79
Imports of developed country group 28.66 18.39
Exports of developing country group 18.93 11.97
Imports of developing country group 22.89 15.63
Removing domestic supports by developed regions
World trade 2.70 -0.71
Exports of developed country group 0.85 -3.42
Imports of developed country group 5.43 1.82
Exports of developing country group 5.54 3.44
Imports of developing country group -1.54 -4.70
Removing export subsidies by all regions
World trade -0.66 -1.76
Exports of developed country group -1.43 -3.04
Imports of developed country group -0.44 -1.25
Exports of developing country group 0.51 0.22
Imports of developing country group -1.01 -2.54  6
countries explains about 80 percent of the rise in world agricultural prices.  That is, 
eliminating agricultural support and trade protection in the developed country group only, 
world agricultural prices are estimated to rise by 9 percent relative to non-agricultural 
prices (table 1). Eliminating trade protection in the developing country group, world 
agricultural prices only rise by 2.3 percent.  
 
There are three reasons that help to explain why liberalization in the developed 
countries causes world agricultural prices to rise.  First, as a group, developed countries 
import more agricultural goods than do developing countries.  If we ignore intra-regional 
trade among the member countries of the EU and the European Free Trade Area member 
countries, developed countries’ imports accounted for about 57 percent of world 
agricultural trade.  Moreover, the developed country group has an average agricultural 
tariff (equivalent) rate of 24 percent compared to a rate of 20 percent for the developing 
country group (table A1).  This high rate is mainly due to the high rates for grain and 
livestock product imports by Japan, Korea, the EU and the member countries of the 
European Free Trade Area (see table A2), while the tariff rates are low in other developed 
countries, such as in Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the United States.  Second, the 
average export subsidy rate for the developed country group is 4.8 percent, and only 0.13 
percent for the developing country group (table A1).  Finally, domestic support policies 
have been mainly employed by the developed countries.  
 
  Since agricultural support and protection rates in the developed countries are 
higher than those in the developing countries, and since the developed countries are 
major players in world agricultural markets, it is a logical result that liberalizing their 
agricultural support and trade policy causes world agricultural prices to rise.  More 
specifically, removing import tariffs, domestic support, and export subsidies in the EU 
alone, holding the policy of other countries unchanged, causes world prices to rise by 4.4 
percent.  In other words, more than one-third of the world price increase that would come 
about from total world liberalization is due to liberalization in the EU.  Ranking second in 
this regard is the U.S., while Japan and Korea rank third.  When we hold the policy 
variables constant for the other countries and only eliminate the agricultural support and 
trade protection in the U.S., world agricultural prices rise by 1.8 percent.  Liberalization 
of Japan’s and Korea’s agriculture causes world agricultural prices to rise about 1.5 
percent (table 1).   
 
2.2. Livestock product prices rise the most in response to liberalization 
 
  The data indicate that, for the world as a whole, the livestock and livestock 
product trade faces the highest level of import protection and export subsidies in 
comparison to the other agricultural commodity categories (table A1).  Moreover, the 
value of world livestock product trade is almost twice the value of world trade in grain 
products.  Consequently, world livestock product prices rise more than other commodity 
prices after liberalization.  If all forms of domestic support and border protection in 
agriculture are removed, the results suggest that world livestock product price would rise 
by about 22 percent, while grain and other crop prices rise by 6 - 18 percent (table 2).  
Again, the developed countries appear to be the major reason for the rise in world   7
livestock product prices.  This result is due to the fact that developed countries dominate 
world trade in this sector, as well as highly protecting the sector from import competition 
(table A2).   
 
  The resulting high agricultural commodity prices that are likely to prevail in this 
case affects agricultural importing countries differently.  Those developing countries that 
are importers of grain and livestock products, and in which tariff rates on imports are not 
prohibitively high, end up facing increased import costs with the result that consumer’s 
interests are adversely affected.  For those developed countries that are also grain and 
livestock product importers but in which tariff rates on imports are almost prohibitively 
high, such as Japan and Korea, the prices faced by their domestic consumers may not 
rise.  Thus, consumers in these countries are likely to benefit from agricultural 
liberalization while their producers may be hurt due to competition from lower cost 
foreign producers.  
 
3. Liberalization enhances trade, but among sectors, production is affected 
differently 
 
  In general, freer trade is expected to result in more trade.  Our model results 
indicate that world agricultural trade is likely to increase substantially after liberalization. 
Removing all agricultural support and protection world-wide results in an increase in the 
value of world agricultural trade by about 30 percent.  By deflating to account for 
changing prices, the volume of world trade is calculated to rise by 15 percent (table 3). 
 
Agricultural exports from developed countries raise by 32 percent, while exports 
from developing countries increase by 27 percent.  Thus, the corresponding increase in 
the volume of exports from the developing countries is larger than the increase from the 
developed countries (16 vs. 14 percent, respectively).  This interesting result implies that 
the prices for the agricultural goods exported by the developed countries rise more than 
the prices of the agricultural goods exported by the developing countries.  The reason for 
this result is that the developed country group exports more livestock products, 
accounting for 76 percent of world livestock product trade, while the developing country 
group exports more vegetable, fruits, oilseeds, sugar, and other crop products.  While, as 
mentioned above, world livestock product prices could rise by 22 percent, the world 
prices for the non-grain crop product categories rise by 6 - 11 percent (except for sugar of 
which the world price rises by 16 percent, table 2). 
 
The removal of import protection is a dominant factor causing the increased 
growth in world agricultural trade.  When we only eliminate agricultural tariffs in the 
world, world trade rises by 26 percent in value and 17 percent in volume.  Exports and 
imports both rise more in the developed country group than agricultural exports and 
imports of the developing country group. This disparity is due to the relatively high 
protection rates in the developed country group.  Moreover, developed country group’s 
exports rise more than the increase in its imports, both in the value and volume, while the 
developing country group’s imports rise more than the increase in its exports.  This   8
important result indicates that the terms of trade improve in the developed country group, 
relative to the developing country group (table 6). 
 
Removing export subsidies or domestic support alone appears not to enhance 
world agricultural trade.  When we only eliminate the agricultural export subsidies world-
wide, world agricultural trade falls by 0.7 percent in value and 1.8 percent in volume.   If 
we only eliminate domestic support in the developed countries, world agricultural trade 
rises by 2.8 percent in value but falls slightly (by 0.7 percent) in the volume (table 3).  
These results are consistent with the prediction of trade theory.  That is, subsidies 
increase exports, albeit at the possible cost of reducing the exports of the non-subsidized 
sectors. Their removal can decrease total trade depending upon how consumers allocate 
the savings from the former taxes needed to finance the subsidies and the extent to which 
the other non-subsidized sectors respond to the slight increase in resources that are 
released from the formerly subsidized sector. 
 
Even though world trade does not change much when subsidies are removed 
world-wide, as the subsidy policies are mainly applied by the developed countries, the 
results suggest that exports from the developing country group would rise, while exports 
of the developed country group fall.  If the export subsidies were removed world-wide, 
the developing country group’s exports would rise by 0.5 percent in value and 0.2 percent 
in volume, while the developed country group’s exports fall by 1.4 and 3 percent in value 
and volume, respectively.  When the domestic subsidies are eliminated in developed 
countries, the developing country group’s exports rise by 5.5 and 3.4 percent in the value 
and volume, while the developed country group’s exports rise 0.9 percent in value and 
fall by 3.4 percent in volume (table 3).  These results indicate that, by stimulating 
domestic production and enhancing exports, the developed countries’ export subsidy or 
domestic support policies have lessened the market shares of some developing countries 
that are net exporters of the agricultural commodities on which the developed countries 
have applied supporting policies, but benefited others that are net importers of these 
commodities. The net importers benefit because the subsidy and support policies lower 
the prices these countries would otherwise face if world markets were undistorted.  
 
3.1. Grains, sugar, and livestock product trade rises more after liberalization 
 
With the highest import protection rates on the trade in grains, sugar, and 
livestock products, it is not surprising to find that liberalization causes world trade of 
grains, (especially wheat and rice), sugar, and livestock products to increase more than 
other agricultural products.  Our results suggest that the value of world rice, wheat, sugar, 
and livestock product trade would likely increases by about 78, 38, 44, and 61 percent, 
respectively, due to reform.  This sharp rise stands out relative to the rise of 14 - 24 
percent for the other crop and processed food trade (table 4). 
 
Once again, the increase in both developed and developing regions’ grain, sugar, 
and livestock product exports is mainly due to liberalization in the developed countries.  
When we only eliminate agricultural support and trade protection in the developed 
countries, the world trade of rice, wheat, sugar, and livestock products rises by 70, 30, 35, Table 4. Decomposition of World Agricultural Trade Effects of Global Agricultural 
               Liberalization 
           -- Percentage Change in World Agricultural Trade by Sector from the Base Year
EXP-1 EXP-2 EXP-3 EXP-4
Value Volume Value Volume Value Volume Value Volume
Wheat 37.64 13.41 17.71 12.62 7.40 -3.56 -0.69 -2.16
Rice 78.12 47.21 76.70 52.72 1.66 -0.69 -0.68 -2.02
Other grains 24.19 3.87 7.24 4.80 9.02 -3.02 0.17 -0.40
Vegetable and fruits 14.15 8.23 15.27 9.60 -0.62 -0.56 -0.37 -0.68
Oil & oilseeds 23.50 11.38 11.66 8.05 11.11 3.45 0.00 -0.05
Sugar 44.43 23.24 43.57 27.72 1.72 0.10 -1.50 -4.12
Other crops 14.08 7.59 13.26 8.25 0.87 0.29 -0.13 -0.20
Livestock and products 61.42 28.96 56.62 35.75 3.76 -1.45 -1.60 -4.35
Processed food 18.27 9.61 18.59 12.80 0.45 -1.25 -0.61 -1.55
EXP-1: Removing all agricultural support and protection in the world
EXP-2: Removing tariffs in the world
EXP-3: Removing domestic support in the developed countries
EXP-4: Removing export subsidies in the worldTable 5. Decomposition of  Agricultural Production Effects of Global Agricultural Liberalization 
 -- Percentage Change in Output of Selected Agricultural Goods from the Base Year
EXP-1 EXP-2 EXP-3 EXP-4
World DCs LDCs World DCs LDCs World DCs LDCs World DCs LDCs
Wheat 2.12 1.23 2.70 1.20 5.02 -1.04 -0.04 -5.07 2.92 0.07 -1.03 0.71
Rice -1.65 -8.42 0.91 -1.18 -6.05 0.59 -0.21 -1.19 0.15 -0.03 -0.34 0.09
Other grains 1.83 1.07 2.48 2.19 4.71 -0.27 -0.49 -3.18 2.13 -0.11 -0.43 0.20
Vegetable and fruits 0.25 0.60 0.10 0.39 0.56 0.28 -0.10 0.04 -0.20 0.02 -0.03 0.06
Oil & oilseeds 0.70 -5.28 4.84 1.04 2.02 0.32 -0.49 -6.99 4.28 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02
Sugar -1.01 -10.09 3.21 -0.26 -6.18 2.32 -0.64 -2.72 0.27 -0.16 -1.68 0.50
Other crops -0.28 -2.78 1.47 0.16 -1.37 1.22 -0.44 -1.44 0.27 -0.03 -0.04 -0.02
Livestock and products -1.04 -2.53 1.38 1.28 1.96 0.17 -1.90 -3.47 0.67 -0.24 -0.61 0.36
Processed food -0.09 -0.33 0.46 1.00 1.46 -0.02 -0.96 -1.51 0.26 -0.11 -0.23 0.16
EXP-1: Removing all agricultural support and protection in the world
EXP-2: Removing tariffs in the world
EXP-3: Removing domestic support in the developed countries
EXP-4: Removing export subsidies in the worldTable 6. Decomposition of  Terms of Trade Effects of Global Agricultural
               Liberalization
      -- Percentage Change in Terms of Trade from the Base Year
EXP-1 EXP-2 EXP-3 EXP-4
Developed country group 0.08 -0.02 0.03 0.06
Australia and New Zealand 1.82 1.40 0.37 0.03
Japan and Korea -1.36 -0.84 -0.32 -0.14
USA 0.86 0.54 0.29 0.00
Canada 0.35 0.16 0.22 -0.02
European Union 0.24 0.02 0.01 0.16
EFT 0.12 -0.27 -0.21 0.56
Developing country group -0.15 0.03 -0.07 -0.11
China 0.26 0.36 -0.04 -0.06
Other Asian countries 0.00 -0.02 0.05 -0.04
Mexico -0.43 -0.20 -0.15 -0.07
Latin America 1.41 1.10 0.32 -0.03
South African countries -0.35 0.13 -0.20 -0.22
Rest of the world -0.98 -0.43 -0.28 -0.23
EXP-1: Removing all agricultural support and protection in the world
EXP-2: Removing tariffs in the world
EXP-3: Removing domestic support in the developed countries
EXP-4: Removing export subsidies in the world  9
and 50 percent, respectively.  Reversing the experiment, by holding the developed 
country group unchanged, we find that world trade in grains, other crops, and livestock 
products only rise by 4 – 12 percent (table 4).   
 
3.2. Production effects vary among the sectors 
 
  In contrast to the relatively large world trade effects of agricultural reform, the 
model results suggest that reform only slightly affects the level of world agricultural 
production, at least in the aggregate.  However, for some commodities, such as wheat, the 
effect is relatively large.  Moreover, the change in production is not always in the same 
direction as is the change in net trade.  For example, the value of world rice trade 
increases almost 80 percent when all the agricultural support and trade protection are 
removed world-wide, while the world-wide production of rice falls by 1.7 percent (table 
5).  In addition, rice production falls by 8.4 percent in the developed country group, due 
to almost 20 percent of decline in Japan and Korea, while rice production rises by 1 
percent in the developing country group.  It is well known that rice imports have been 
strictly restricted in Japan and Korea and domestic rice in the two countries is three times 
more expensive than the rice in the world market.  When the protection afforded rice 
producers is removed world-wide, so that all farmers in different countries  face 
essentially the same price, the disadvantage of rice production in Japan and Korea 
becomes obvious and hence their production falls. 
 
Besides rice, the production of sugar (including sugar crops and raw sugar), other 
crops, and livestock products also falls slightly in the world after the reform (table 5).  
Such decline is due to the decline in production in the developed country group, while 
production of these commodities rises in the developing country group.  The rise in 
production of these commodities in the developing countries however is not sufficient to 
cover the fall in production in the developed countries. For example, sugar production 
falls by 1 percent in the world and 10 percent in the developed country group when all 
the agricultural support and trade protection are removed world-wide, while sugar 
production rises by 3.2 percent in the developing country group.  Some developed 
countries, such as Japan, member countries of EU, the European Free Trade Area, and the 
U.S. highly protect sugar sector by both high level of tariffs and export subsidies.  
Eliminating agricultural protection world-wide strongly suggests that some of these 
countries have less of a comparative advantage in either growing or processing, and 
hence sugar production falls in these countries.  For example, sugar production falls more 
than 20 percent in Japan and Korea, more than 10 percent in the EU and the European 
Free Trade Area, and almost 10 percent in the U.S.    
 
Wheat production is observed to increase the most among agricultural 
commodities when all agricultural support and trade protection are removed world-wide.  
The results suggest that world wheat production is likely to rise by almost 2 percent, and 
rises more than 1 percent in the developed country groups, mainly due to the increases in 
Australia and New Zealand, Canada, and the U.S. These countries appear to hold a strong 
comparative advantage in wheat production. Wheat production rises almost 3 percent in 
the developing countries.  For example, U.S. wheat production would rise by 9 percent,   10
mainly due to the tariff removal in other countries.  In the other developed countries, such 
as Japan and EU, wheat production falls considerably (30 and 18 percent, respectively). 
 
Tariffs, export subsidies and domestic support have quite different effects on 
production levels among different countries.  Removing tariffs world-wide would 
stimulate production in most agricultural sectors (except for rice and sugar), though quite 
small for most sectors.  Corn and other grains is an exception as production rises by more 
than 2 percent in this aggregate sector.  Under this scenario, wheat and corn and other 
grain production mainly rises in the developed country group (about 5 percent), while 
their production falls slightly in the developing country group.  However, sugar and other 
crops’ production rise by 2.3 and 1.2 percent, respectively, in the developing country 
group and falls by 6.2 and 1.4 percent, respectively, in the developed country group (table 
5).  Under this scenario, besides a 5 percent of rise in U.S. wheat production, U.S. corn 
and other grain, and livestock production also rise by 5 and 7 percent, respectively. 
 
In contrast to tariff liberalization, the results suggest that removing export 
subsidies only world-wide or only removing domestic support in the developed countries 
would have a negative, though almost negligible, effect on most agricultural production.  
The negative effect on the developed countries’ agricultural production is much larger 
than that on the world production level, while production rises in most sectors in the 
developing country group (table 5).  For example, removing domestic support in the 
developed countries causes production of oilseeds and vegetable oil to fall by 0.5 percent 
in the world, but fall almost 7 percent in the developed country group, and rise more than 
4 percent in the developing country group.  Oilseeds and vegetable oil production falls 
the most in the EU (fall by 19 percent) due to oilseed production is highly supported in 
the EU in the base data.   Under this scenario, U.S. grain production would fall, for 
example, wheat would fall by 5 percent and corn by 1.2 percent. 
  
4. Welfare effects of reforming agricultural policies are mixed 
  
From a world perspective, the more efficient allocation of resources yields higher 
global welfare. Typically, in a country with a high degree of agricultural support and 
trade protection, consumers pay relatively high prices for food and other agricultural 
goods, and/or their disposable income is taxed to cover the costs of agricultural policies.  
Removing support or trade protection is expected to benefit consumers.  However, from 
the global perspective, and especially when the world price is affected by agricultural 
liberalization, the welfare effect across countries varies.   
The results of our analysis of the welfare effects of reform suggests that 
consumers can be made worse off if the country’s terms of trade deteriorate following 
liberalization.  That is, if the prices of the goods they export fall relative to the prices of 
goods they import, then consumers can be made worse since their expenditures on 
imported goods increase while their income from exported goods falls.  Moreover, 
consumers in a small country with a low tariff rate, e.g., Mexico, may not benefit by 
liberalization in high tariff countries (e.g., Japan), as trade diversion may result.  In other 
words, a country may import more from those trade partners for whom, prior to reform, 
the country imposed high tariff rates.  While, post reform, the country imports less from   11
trade partners for which prior to reform it imposed low tariff rates.  In this case, 
consumers in this type of a country may experience negative effects from the world-wide 
trade reform. 
  
4.1 Small one-time welfare gains 
 
  We use the well-accepted equivalent variation (often referred to as the willingness 
to pay) to measure the social welfare gains or losses due to agricultural liberalization.  
We consider both one-time welfare effects and welfare effects over time.  The one-time 
effects are measured by using the status-quo (pre-reform) prices as the base, and address 
the question: what income would be equivalent to the change brought about by 
agricultural liberalization (Varian, 1984).  The welfare effects over time are measured by 
summing the discounted value of this measure over time. 
 
  As table 7 shows, the one-time effects of agricultural liberalization on nation’s 
social welfare appear relatively small among all countries/regions.  The reason for this 
result is that, relative to non-agriculture, agriculture accounts for a small share of GDP. 
Further, agricultural goods in consumer’s consumption bundle in most countries, and 
particularly so in the developed economies of Europe and North America, are relatively 
small in proportion to their total expenditures.  Taking the developed and developing 
countries as two separate groups, agriculture (including processed food products) only 
accounts for less than 5 and 15 percent, respectively, of these two groups’ GDP. 
Consumption expenditures on food account for 5 percent of total expenditures for the 
developed country group and 17 percent for the developing country group.  Thus, at a 
national level, agricultural liberalization alone is unlikely to have a large one-time 
welfare effect on the aggregate economy in the short to medium-run. 
 
  Nevertheless, these relatively small aggregate welfare effects for the case of 
developing countries can be seriously misleading.  The reason is two fold.  First, it is well 
known that in low-income countries a majority of the poor reside in rural areas where 
primary agriculture is a major source of income, either directly or indirectly through rural 
labor markets and in value added activities related to primary agriculture.  Second, 
monetary returns to the market surplus from primary agriculture (i.e., farm production 
less own consumption) is closely linked to foreign markets.  Thus, the national level 
effects of reform mentioned above are likely to be small in proportion to the benefits 
received by rural households, and in particular, rural households whose disposable 
income ranks them in the bottom quintile of a country’s distribution of income. 
 
  Given these caveats, the welfare effects are positive for the world aggregate.  The 
sum of countries’ equivalent variation is about 30 billion U.S. dollars due the world-wide 
agricultural liberalization.  This is equivalent to 0.1 percent of world aggregate GDP, and 
one percent of consumers’ expenditure on agricultural and agriculture-related goods 
(table 7, EXP-1).  Such welfare gains are not equally distributed among countries and 
regions in the world, and for some countries, the welfare effect is even negative.  The 
developed countries are estimated to experience a 28 billion dollar welfare gain, which is 
equivalent to 0.16 and 2 percent of their GDP and consumers’ expenditure on agricultural Table 7. Decomposition of Static Welfare Effects of Global Agricultural Liberalization
EXP-1 EXP-2 EXP-3 EXP-4
Billion % in total % to agr. Billion % in total % to agr. Billion % in total % to agr. Billion % in total % to agr.
($) expenditure consumption ($) expenditure consumption ($) expenditure consumption ($) expenditure consumption
World 31.06 0.13 1.21 25.22 0.11 0.98 2.80 0.01 0.11 0.25 0.00 0.01
Developed country group 28.48 0.16 2.04 19.56 0.11 1.40 4.74 0.03 0.34 2.53 0.01 0.18
Australia and New Zealand 1.57 0.44 4.46 1.17 0.33 3.33 0.24 0.07 0.69 0.01 0.00 0.03
Japan and Korea 8.59 0.27 2.41 13.81 0.43 3.87 -3.66 -0.11 -1.02 -1.34 -0.04 -0.38
USA 6.57 0.10 1.51 3.83 0.06 0.88 0.97 0.01 0.22 -0.09 0.00 -0.02
Canada 0.75 0.15 2.01 0.40 0.08 1.07 0.28 0.06 0.76 -0.09 -0.02 -0.25
European Union 9.28 0.14 1.81 0.14 0.00 0.03 6.06 0.09 1.18 3.72 0.06 0.73
EFT 1.73 0.58 7.34 0.20 0.07 0.87 0.83 0.28 3.54 0.32 0.11 1.37
Developing country group 2.60 0.05 0.22 5.66 0.11 0.48 -1.94 -0.04 -0.16 -2.28 -0.04 -0.19
China 0.42 0.07 0.20 0.85 0.13 0.42 -0.28 -0.04 -0.14 -0.21 -0.03 -0.10
Other Asian countries 1.52 0.14 0.53 1.71 0.16 0.60 -0.09 -0.01 -0.03 -0.25 -0.02 -0.09
Mexico -0.16 -0.06 -0.24 0.19 0.06 0.27 -0.27 -0.09 -0.41 -0.11 -0.04 -0.17
Latin America 3.65 0.28 1.64 2.71 0.21 1.22 0.68 0.05 0.31 -0.05 0.00 -0.03
South African countries 0.25 0.09 0.30 0.60 0.21 0.72 -0.22 -0.07 -0.26 -0.22 -0.08 -0.26
Rest of the world -3.07 -0.18 -0.97 -0.39 -0.02 -0.12 -1.76 -0.10 -0.56 -1.43 -0.08 -0.45  12
goods, respectively.  Moreover, all developed countries in the model gain, with the 
largest gains of 9.3 billion dollars for the EU, 8.6 billion for Japan and Korea and 6.6 
billion for the U.S. 
 
The welfare gains for the developing country group is much smaller, 2.6 billion 
dollars.  This is equivalent to 0.05 and 0.2 percent of their GDP and consumers’ 
expenditure on agricultural goods.  Furthermore, there are some countries/regions in 
which the welfare effect is negative.  Mexico is estimated to experience a 160 million 
dollar welfare loss, which is equivalent to less than 0.06 percent of her GDP. 
 
  An import reason explaining why most developing countries experience smaller 
total welfare gains than do developed countries is that agriculture in developing countries 
is distorted by more than just agricultural policies.  While the level of domestic support 
and trade protection in the nonagricultural sector is quite low among most developed 
countries, many developing countries still highly protect their import competing 
manufacturing and service sectors.  This protection tends to implicitly tax agricultural 
producers.  In extreme cases, removing agricultural protection in such countries (such as 
Morocco) can actually lower social welfare because the implicit tax imposed on 
agriculture by policies in other sectors actually increases when protection is taken from 
agriculture.  Thus, in these countries, agriculture is not only distorted by the agricultural 
protection policies in high-income countries, but also by their countries’ own 
manufacturing policies and distortions in service sector markets.   
 
The negative effect of the world agricultural liberalization on Mexico and some 
other countries is mainly caused by, post reform, a deterioration in their terms of trade 
(table 6).  To see this, consider Mexico. Mexico depends on the U.S. economy for both 
her agricultural imports and exports, while the U.S. is more dependent on Japan, Korea 
and the EU for agricultural exports.  It is well known that Japan, Korea, and the EU 
highly protect agriculture relative to other countries.  When world agriculture and 
agricultural trade are fully liberalized, increased import demand from Japan, Korea and 
EU on U.S. agricultural goods causes U.S. export prices to rise.  This causes Mexico to 
pay high prices for imports from U.S., post-reform.  On the other hand, there are much 
lower barriers to trade between U.S. and Mexico after the NAFTA.  When world trade is 
fully liberalized, the U.S. imports from Mexico may not rise to the degree that imports 
rise from the non-NAFTA countries since, pre-reform, the U.S. imposed relatively high 
barriers to the goods imported from non-NAFTA countries.  However, Mexico depends 
on U.S. imports, as her trade with U.S. accounts for more than 70 percent of Mexico’s 
exports.  This implies that the price Mexico receives for her exports cannot rise to the 
same degree as the rise in price it must pay for imports.  The result is a deterioration in 
the country’s terms of trade. 
 
This interesting result implies that some member countries of a trade bloc may 
experience a welfare loss because, post reform, they suffer a decline in demand for the 
goods they export to former member countries, while world demand for the goods they 
import rise.  
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These results also attest to the fact that policies that distort agriculture in 
developed countries raise world supplies of the goods and thus indirectly subsidize 
consumers in countries that are net agricultural importers.  Liberalization raises world 
prices of most agricultural goods, but some more than others.  Nevertheless, even in those 
low income and net agricultural importing countries that experience a decline in their 
terms of trade, returns to their agricultural resources (land, labor, farm machinery and 
buildings) are biased downwards from what would otherwise prevail in a distortion-free 
economy.  Consequently, their agricultural households, defined as those rural households 
that are net suppliers of agricultural goods, are likely to be made better off as the result of 
trade reform. 
 
4.2 Removal of import protection leads to welfare gains while lowering domestic 
support and export subsidies can lead to welfare losses 
 
  Among the three policy categories, removing tariffs generates positive welfare 
gains at the world level of aggregation and to most countries and regions, while removing 
domestic support and export subsidies has negative effects for most developing countries.  
Holding other policy variables constant, removing tariffs results in 25 billion U.S. dollar 
welfare gain world-wide, 19.6 billion of which accrues to the developed countries and 5.7 
billion to the developing countries.  Removing domestic support or export subsidies 
results in a much smaller welfare gain world-wide, as export subsidy rates are much 
lower than the tariff rates in all countries/regions and the domestic support policies are 
mainly employed by the developed countries.  The world aggregate welfare gain from the 
removal of domestic support is 2.8 billion dollars and is 250 million from the removal of 
export subsidies.  The gain for the developed countries as a group is 4.7 billion in the first 
case (domestic support removal) and 2.5 billion in the second (export subsidy removal).  
However, the developing countries as a group are observed to have 1.9 and 2.3 billion of 
welfare loss in the two cases, respectively.   
 
Almost all developing countries/regions in the model (except for the Latin 
American countries) experience a welfare loss when the domestic subsidies are removed 
in the developed countries or export subsidies are removed in the world.  This outcome is 
due to the resulting rise in the world prices for grain and livestock products of which 
most developing countries are net importers (except for the region of Latin American 
countries which is a net exporter for the livestock products as well as for the aggregation 
of the primary agricultural products).  Thus, we observe that for most developing 
countries/regions, their welfare measures tend to deteriorate due to the hike in the world 
agricultural prices.  
  
The region of Japan and Korea is observed to have the largest decline (3.7 billion 
U.S. dollars) in welfare in the world when the developed countries remove their domestic 
support, even though the support rate in Japan and Korea on average is much lower than 
that in Canada, the U.S. and EU.  This result occurs because these two countries are net 
agricultural importers, and agricultural prices rise in the world with agricultural supply 
declines in the U.S. and EU due to the removal of domestic support.  If we presume that 
only the U.S. or the EU eliminates its domestic support to agriculture, the social welfare   14
in Japan and Korea falls by 2.1 and 0.55 billion dollars, respectively, while if Japan and 
Korea eliminate their domestic support only, their welfare falls by 0.66 billion dollars.   
 
4.3 Relatively large dynamic welfare gains 
 
4.3.1 A brief overview of method and assumptions 
 
  The previous analysis ignored the affect of reform on savings, investment and the 
pattern of growth in a country’s capital stock. To analyze these effects requires 
assumptions regarding household’s willingness to forgo consumption and invest, the 
functioning of capital markets and international capital flows, as well as the technological 
spillovers that seem to accompany growth countries’ trade.  For developed countries, 
these assumptions may be closely approximated, and only poorly approximated for many 
developing countries.  Nevertheless, for the most part, the analysis suggests direction of 
change in the long-run that seem well within the realm of reason. 
 
Numerous studies have found empirically strong and positive linkages between 
growth and a country’s total factor productivity (TFP) and the share of its economy 
involved in trade with more advanced nations (for example, Coe and Helpman, 1995: 
Wang and Xu, 1997; and Coe, et. al., 1997).  Thus, we use a dynamic model to not only 
capture consumer’s saving and producer’s investment decisions, but also the effects of 
trade liberalization on a country’s growth in factor productivity.  Such effects are 
modeled by increases in technological spillovers embodied in the trade between 
developing and developed countries.  Specifically, if a developing country eliminates 
trade protection, it then tends to increase its rate of learning new skills, organizational 
methods, and to adapt and adopt the more advanced product and process technologies 
that tend to be embodied in its imports from the developed countries. The result of this 
process is to increase labor productivity and returns to land and social capital (Grossman 
and Helpman, 1991; Romer, 1994).  The spillovers of the advanced technology embodied 
in trade can also happen by reducing agricultural protection in developed countries.  In 
this case, as developed countries increase imports of agricultural goods, their exports of 
capital goods may be enhanced.  Thus, this longer-run type of analysis allows for 
agricultural trade reform to yield broader economy-wide benefits, which, as we show 
below, found to be higher for developing countries.  
 
To measure the welfare gains in this dynamic setting, we calculate the change in 
the regional equivalent variation for three different years as well as the intertemporal 
welfare index.  Changes in equivalent variation for the three different years are compared 
with the base year, while the intertemporal welfare index is the sum of the welfare change 
over time where future gains and losses are discounted relative to current gains and 
losses.  The over time welfare effects of the liberalization vary, as one would expect, 
depending on whether technological spillover-growth considerations are included in the 
analysis.  Thus, we specify the welfare changes under the different assumptions, and 
hence the technological spillovers and growth effect of the liberalization on the welfare 
can be told from the differences in the two groups of results.   
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4.3.2 Results 
 
Without taking into account the technological spillover-growth effects of 
liberalization, (that is, by considering only the investment incentives created by reform) 
the over time welfare effect is still modest, especially in a short run, for instance, in the 
first five years (table 8).  As production and investment adjustments take time, the 
welfare effect in a longer time period, for example, in the 15th year or after, is relatively 
large.  The world welfare gain in year-10 doubles the gain accrued in year-5.  More 
simply stated, this result suggests that the pay-off to reform takes time. 
 
However, if the technological spillover-growth effect of liberalization is taken 
into account for the case of the developing countries, the over time welfare gains increase 
significantly, especially in developing countries.  The developing countries are 
beneficiaries of the technological spillovers embodied in trade with developed countries.  
Such beneficiaries are assumed to generate an additional annual growth rate of 0.02 
percent in the developing countries in average.  With this 0.02 percent of more growth 
annually, welfare gains further increase among the developing countries.  Moreover, all 
the developing countries/regions in the model are better off after agricultural support and 
trade protection are totally removed world-wide, and the greater the volume of trade 
between developed and developing countries, the larger is the welfare gain.  
 
The developed countries benefit indirectly from the growth in productivity in the 
developing countries, even though the developed countries are presumed not to 
experience technological spillovers from increase in trade and hence there is no 
additional growth generated from trade liberalization.  The main reason for this 
interesting and important result is that, with increased investment in the developing 
countries, developed countries gain from returns to capital flows, i.e., from financial 
support through the international financial capital market since most of the developing 
countries do not have sufficient domestic savings to fully finance their growth in 
investment demand.  This growth in investment demand creates opportunities for the 
developed countries to invest abroad, either through international lending activities or 
foreign direct investment in the developing countries.  These indirect effects generated 
from the growing demand for foreign capital inflows to the developing countries tends to 
be stronger if the economic adjustments in the developing countries due to agricultural 
liberalization in the world are expected to be larger.  This win-win result is also 
consistent with the concluding comments of Summers (2000) in his Richard T. Ely 




  This study focuses on the global perspectives of new agricultural negotiations 
under the WTO and, in the spirit of the commitments made by signatories to the UR Final 
Act (1994), analyzes the case of total reform under the three disciplines: domestic 
support, border protection and export subsidies.  The study finds that freer trade results in 
more trade, i.e., eliminating most of agricultural support and trade protection increases 
world agricultural trade substantially.  However, world agricultural production only Table 8. Dynamic Welfare Effects of Global Agricultural Liberalization in the Model
Without TFP growth With TFP growth
Intertemporal Intertemporal
Year 5 Year 10 Year 15 effect Year 5 Year 10 Year 15 effect
$billion % $billion % $billion % % $billion % $billion % $billion % %
World 15.94 0.07 30.19 0.13 36.26 0.16 27.17 0.12 46.98 0.20 56.39 0.24
Developed country group 14.69 0.08 25.66 0.14 29.74 0.17 17.00 0.10 29.59 0.17 35.14 0.20
Australia and New Zealand 3.26 0.91 3.34 0.93 3.40 0.94 0.45 3.32 0.92 3.43 0.95 3.52 0.98 0.46
Japan and Korea -1.40 -0.04 3.86 0.12 5.10 0.16 0.00 -0.85 -0.03 4.70 0.15 6.17 0.19 0.00
USA 8.72 0.13 10.60 0.16 11.76 0.18 0.11 9.18 0.14 11.59 0.17 13.30 0.20 0.12
Canada 1.05 0.21 1.17 0.24 1.24 0.25 0.07 1.13 0.23 1.27 0.26 1.37 0.28 0.07
European Union 3.35 0.05 6.68 0.10 8.15 0.12 0.03 4.41 0.07 8.48 0.13 10.58 0.16 0.04
EFT -0.27 -0.09 0.02 0.01 0.09 0.03 -0.03 -0.18 -0.06 0.12 0.04 0.21 0.07 0.00
Developing country group 1.25 0.02 4.52 0.09 6.52 0.12 10.16 0.19 17.39 0.33 21.25 0.40
China 1.24 0.20 1.68 0.26 1.83 0.29 0.11 1.48 0.23 2.02 0.32 2.23 0.35 0.14
Other Asian countries -0.70 -0.06 0.54 0.05 0.93 0.09 -0.02 2.10 0.19 4.47 0.41 5.11 0.47 0.13
Mexico -0.40 -0.14 -0.22 -0.07 0.09 0.03 -0.04 0.53 0.18 0.99 0.33 1.60 0.54 0.14
Latin America 3.94 0.30 4.27 0.33 4.66 0.36 0.16 4.62 0.35 5.36 0.41 6.11 0.47 0.19
South African countries 0.16 0.06 0.33 0.11 0.50 0.17 0.05 0.35 0.12 0.59 0.20 0.81 0.28 0.08
Rest of the world -3.00 -0.17 -2.07 -0.12 -1.49 -0.08 -0.18 1.07 0.06 3.97 0.26 5.39 0.32 0.00  16
increases marginally, with the largest decrease occurring in the developed countries.  As 
agricultural support and protection rates are higher in some developed countries than 
those in the developing countries, and as the developed countries are major players in 
world agricultural trade, developed countries appear to benefit more from liberalization 
than do the developing countries.   
 
Nevertheless, world-wide agricultural liberalization would cause world prices to 
rise.  Of the three categories, domestic support, boarder protection, and export subsidies, 
the results suggest that boarder protection is the major cause of distortions in world 
agricultural prices.  The elimination, world-wide, of import tariffs would cause world 
agricultural prices to rise by about 6 percent. 
 
Within the developed country group, the major contributors to distorted world 
agricultural prices are EU, the U.S., and Japan and Korea.  Consequently, these countries 
experience the largest social pay-off from reform relative to the rest of the world in 
general, and the developing countries in particular.  As the protection levels and trade 
patterns vary among countries, some developing countries experience larger increase in 
the prices for importing goods than the increases in the prices for exports.  Such negative 
terms of trade effect may cause these developing countries to experience welfare losses.  
Furthermore, some member countries of a trade bloc may experience a welfare loss 
because, post reform, they may suffer a decline in demand for the goods they export to 
former member countries, while world demand for the goods they import rise. 
 
  The study also finds that the pay-off to the liberalization takes time.  Over time, 
world-wide agricultural liberalization generates larger gains than the short-time gains for 
most countries.  For example, the study suggests that the discounted present value of 
world welfare gains in year-10 doubles the gain accrued in year-5.  Moreover, if the 
technological spillover-growth effect of liberalization is taken into account, the welfare 
gains increase significantly for all countries in the world.  While the developing countries 
are beneficiaries of the technological spillover embodied in trade with the developed 
countries, the results suggest that developed countries benefit indirectly from the growth 
in productivity in the developing countries.  This benefit is caused by the growth in the 
returns to increased capital flows from developed to developing countries, induced by the 
increased investment demand of the developing countries. 
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Appendix 
 
1. Agricultural sectoral aggregation in the study 
 
Sectors in the model  Sectors in GTAP data 
Rice  Paddy rice, processed rice 
Wheat  Wheat 
Corn and other cereal 
grains 
Corn and other cereal grains 
Vegetable and fruits  Vegetable, fruits and nuts 
Oil seeds and products  Oil seeds, vegetable oil 
Sugar  Sugar cane and sugar beet, sugar 
Other crops and products  Plant-based fibers, other crops 
Livestock and products  Bovine cattle, sheep and goats and meats, other animal 
products, raw milk and dairy products, wool, and silk-
worm cocoons 
Other processed food 
sector 
Beverages and tobacco products, and other processed food 
products 
 
2. Countries and regions included in the study 
 
1) Australia and New Zealand; 2) China, including Hong Kong; 3) Japan and Korea; 4) 
The other Asian countries; 5) Canada; 6) The United States; 7) Mexico; 8) Latin 
American countries; 9) the European Union; 10) the European Free Trade Area; 11) 
South African countries; 12) the rest of the world 
 Table A1. Summary  of Agricultural Support and Protection Data in the Base Year (1997)
Rate of Tariffs (1) Rate of export subsidies (2) Rate of domestic supports (3)
----Percentage ---
 
World average 22.09 2.87
Developed country group 23.67 4.79 5.25




Other grains 8.68 0.69
Vegetable and fruits 12.13 1.01
Oil and oilseeds 12.57 0.00
Sugar 33.95 6.97
Other crops 11.57 0.05
Livestock and products 48.79 7.03
Processed foods 14.90 0.00
Developed country group
Wheat 68.18 2.99 31.55
Rice 73.34 3.79 2.05
Other grains 11.02 0.84 21.84
Vegetable and fruits 10.22 1.92 0.00
Oil and oilseeds 9.50 0.00 9.94
Sugar 59.14 21.27 2.19
Other crops 9.85 0.17 2.75
Livestock and products 68.45 8.78 3.31




Other grains 6.56 0.13
Vegetable and fruits 16.71 0.11
Oil and oilseeds 15.67 0.01
Sugar 14.50 0.16
Other crops 15.82 0.00
Livestock and products 23.23 0.58
Processed foods 26.51 0.00
Regional average
Australia  and New Zeland 5.12 0.01 0.19
Japan and Korea 47.49 2.43
USA 10.65 1.77 2.56
Canada 6.09 2.99
European Union 16.68 12.29 8.19
European Free Trade Area 48.72 43.96 19.29
China 26.47
Other Asian countries 20.71
Mexico 18.93
Latin America 14.67 0.04
South African countries 21.65Table A2. Regional Agricultural Tariff Rates by Sector in the Base Year (1997)
Wheat Rice Other grains Vegetable&fruits Oil and oilseeds
--- Percentage ---
Australia  and New Zealand 0.00 0.89 0.98 2.15 2.58
Japan and Korea 87.57 336.57 6.81 9.51 10.41
USA 2.60 5.28 0.60 4.70 6.74
Canada 50.24 0.00 0.08 0.27 0.00
European Union 42.98 47.66 38.60 10.86 5.68
European Free Trade Area 119.45 0.00 114.23 69.77 186.09
China  13.46 13.11 14.36 12.56 17.26
Other Asian countries 6.23 19.71 3.96 26.45 19.55
Mexico 13.40 15.00 0.77 17.90 6.89
Latin America 5.53 25.57 10.31 13.73 11.10
South African countries 20.20 5.55 21.62 15.46 24.72
Rest of the world 8.49 4.47 6.49 12.13
Sugar Other crops Livestock&products Processed food
--- Percentage ---
Australia  and New Zealand 10.27 2.83 4.43 7.11
Japan and Korea 81.02 7.51 132.39 8.41
USA 53.10 21.46 10.62 8.62
Canada 5.36 0.48 22.63 5.06
European Union 61.91 2.74 42.88 12.20
European Free Trade Area 100.67 55.11 123.57 3.71
China  22.22 25.62 33.28 35.22
Other Asian Countries 26.69 21.72 16.38 28.17
Mexico 4.25 7.43 35.72 19.95
South American countries 18.68 8.34 17.89 17.29
South African countries 11.24 14.63 21.23 30.23Table A3. Sensitivity Test: Effects of Removing Domestic Supports in the Developed Countries
               With and Without Land Based Payments Removal
 --- Percentage change from the base year
Without land based payment removal
World ANZ JPK USA Canada EU EFT
World Agricultural Price 3.55
   Wheat 11.99
   Corn and other grains 12.23
   Oilseeds abd vegetable oil 7.78
Returns to Farmland 4.11 -1.28 -1.38 1.93 -7.26 -21.43
Total social welfare ($billion) 0.24 -3.66 0.97 0.28 6.06 0.82
With land based payment removal but decoupled
World Agricultural Price 3.6
   Wheat 13.04
   Corn and other grains 13.5
   Oilseeds abd vegetable oil 7.7
Returns to Farmland 3.65 -1.3 -8.71 -1.52 -14.49 -32.58
Total social welfare ($billion) 0.25 -3.89 1.04 0.31 5.92 0.83
With land based payment removal and coupled
World Agricultural Price 4.78
   Wheat 22.09
   Corn and other grains 20.95
   Oilseeds abd vegetable oil 8.17
Returns to Farmland 5.09 -0.63 -4.31 6.43 -7.2 -22
Total social welfare ($billion) 0.37 -6.5 1.23 0.34 5.52 0.81RECENT BULLETINS
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